Memory and Theory in Eastern Europe

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Andriy Portnov

Analysts of the post-Soviet memory wars in Ukraine have tended to focus overwhelmingly on the ways in which Ukrainian memory is shaped by regional differences. The regional dimension is certainly important here, but approaching Ukrainian memory exclusively through this lens can serve to obscure other aspects of the landscape. In this chapter, I aim to shift the perspective, with a view to emancipating the rich social reality of Ukrainian memory from the pressures of normative and essentializing schemas and one-sided reductive assessments. Focusing on the changing politics of memory during the presidencies of Leonid Kravchuk (1991–94), Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004) and Viktor Yushchenko (2005–10), I will show that this politics, far from having been structured and predetermined by rigid and entrenched regional fault lines, has in fact been deeply contingent and deeply contradictory. The search for a strategy that would legitimize the new independent Ukraine and its post-Soviet elite without provoking national, linguistic, and/or religious conflict, while all the time with an eye to Russia, was all about improvisation. The lack of a uniform national public consensus on the Soviet past has often been, not so much a force for division, as a stabilizing factor in a state characterized by so much (linguistic, cultural, religious, mnemonic) diversity. It is precisely this lack of a nation-wide consensus that has helped to preserve the distinctive pluralism of Ukraine’s post-Soviet memorial culture. This situational pluralism originates, in a paradoxical way, in a forced mutual interaction of images of the past that, in themselves, are monologic.
The early post-Soviet period

The Ukrainian state that arose as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 immediately confronted the problem of its own historical legitimacy. In its contemporary borders and social structure, Ukraine is first and foremost a product of Soviet-era policies—hardly ideal material for weaving together a new national past. The challenge of forging new historical narratives for an independent Ukraine was further complicated by the fact that the old Soviet elites largely remained in place. It was no accident that Leonid Kravchuk, who was elected president in 1991, had been the head of the agitation and propaganda division of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party since 1980. Those former dissidents who had been co-opted into the upper echelons of power did not stay in these positions for long, and fulfilled rather a decorative function, serving to legitimize the continuity of post-Soviet power elites.

At the same time, historical references had played a huge role in the social movements of the late 1980s. The mass public demonstrations of the period cannot be separated from the mass public rediscovery of the past with which it coincided. The independence movement was both fuelled and shaped by memory events such as the publication of previously forbidden literature, such as the writings of the Ukrainian “Executed Renaissance” of the 1920s and 1930s, debates about the Stalinist terror, and, most of all, the mammy famine of 1932–33. The huge upsurge in public fascination with the past and its interconnection with political developments of that period is exemplified by the case of the “Days of Cossack Glory.” This celebration of Ukraine’s Cossack heritage, staged in August 1990, gathered together hundreds of thousands of people from all over Ukraine on the island of Khortytsia in the Zaporizhzhia region. The strong emotional charge that this historical event carried was closely intertwined with the euphoria surrounding hopes for Ukraine’s future. The linkages between the projects of recovering the lost past and seeking restitution for the sufferings of the past were embodied in a popular legend about Cossack gold. According to the legend, Cossack Hetman Pavlo Polubotok, who died in a tsarist prison in 1724, had deposited a hoard of gold for safekeeping in an English bank at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In the final days of Soviet Ukraine, this legend took on direct political significance. National tradition attributes to Polubotok a daring speech about the freedom of Ukraine, which he supposedly delivered before Peter the Great. Now, as the Ukrainian independence movement gathered strength, the Hetman’s stash of gold represented potential compensation to Ukraine for centuries of oppression at the hands of Russia. On the eve of the “Days of Cossack Glory” in 1990, the Ukrainian Supreme Council held a discussion on this issue. It was claimed in all seriousness that in the event of Polubotok’s hoard being discovered, each citizen of Ukraine would now be entitled to 300,000 pounds. The widespread naïve belief in such mystifications reflected the expectation of a miracle that was so characteristic of Ukraine in the early 1990s. Political independence was seen by millions as a path to the momentary resolution of economic problems, and the expectation of quick and materially tangible effects was far stronger than the will to go through the unavoidable difficulties of establishing statehood.

These expectations would soon give way to disillusionment and uncertainty, and this in turn seriously affected the ordering of the symbolic space of the new state. The fundamental question of how to deal with the Soviet past and its symbols was tackled with the ambivalence characteristic of post-Soviet Ukraine. What’s more, this issue was largely handled at the local administrative level, which led to a striking differentiation in regional initiatives. This differentiation is clear if we compare regional approaches to monuments and place names. The changes here were most dramatic in the historical region of East Galicia in West Ukraine, which was annexed by the USSR only in 1939. The City Council of Chervonohrad in the L’viv region led the way by resolving to dismantle the local Lenin monument on August 1, 1990. Chervonohrad’s example was then followed by other towns and cities throughout the region, such as Ternopil’, L’viv, Ivano-Frankivs’k, and Kolomyia. Almost immediately, Lenin monuments were replaced by memorials and memorial plaques to the leaders of the nationalist movement in the west Ukrainian lands, especially Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych. The process of renaming streets was carried out most extensively in L’viv, where a special commission of historians was set up by the City Council and given the task of erasing the Soviet face of the city. In adopting new toponyms, the commission worked with the aim of “reflecting the Ukrainian character of the city.” It was ruled that any non-Ukrainian historical figures commemorated in the city should have a direct relationship to L’viv, and that the commemoration of individuals
representing an “insult to the national sensitivities of Ukrainians” was not permissible.4 While many Soviet-era place names disappeared as a result, streets named after famous Russians (such as Tchaikovsky, Herzen, Pavlov, Turgenev, and Tolstoy) nevertheless remained the largest group after those named after Ukrainians.

In eastern and southern Ukrainian cities, by contrast, there were no attempts at systematic street renaming or removal of Soviet monuments. As a result, left-bank Ukraine preserved Soviet toponymy, while right-bank Ukraine changed it according to the national narrative. The capital city of Kyiv tried to find a kind of halfway solution, and followed a less consistent policy, which resulted in the coexistence of Soviet and post-Soviet names and monuments. Thus, for example, the monument to Lenin in the center of Kyiv, on Independence Square (previously October Revolution Square), was dismantled, while another, situated nearby on Khreshchatyk (Kyiv’s main central thoroughfare), near the Bessarabskiy Market, was retained. The proximity on the city map of streets named after Ivan Mazepa’s ally Pylyp Orlyk and Ukrainian nationalist poet Olena Teliha to the Bolsheviks Voroshilov, Frunze, and Uritsky is a clear example of post-Soviet “pluralism.”5

In the early 1990s, the passivity shown by the east of Ukraine when it came to the symbolic transformation of city and rural spaces was interpreted by adherents of “de-Russification,” especially in western Ukraine, as evidence of the weakness of national self-awareness in the eastern part of the country.6 In this view, overcoming this weakness would be a matter not of constructing a sense of national identity, but of “awakening” from national lethargy, recovering from Soviet amnesia and returning to “normality” after centuries of foreign domination. Both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were seen by more “nationally conscious” Ukrainians as first and foremost external powers that had used force to bring Ukraine into their orbit. This position ignores the active participation of Ukrainians in the building of the Russian Empire and the USSR, and constructs Ukrainians exclusively as victims of external aggression.

One of the most important historical topics that demanded at least some attempt at integration into the new official narrative was that of the “Great Patriotic War.” The memory of this war was to a large degree structured by Soviet policies of the 1960s–1980s. The enduring emotional charge carried by the war memory acted as a constraining force when it came to post-Soviet transformations of the memorial landscape. In western Ukraine, numerous memorials to the national underground movement have been erected, but these coexist alongside monuments to Soviet soldiers, which, unlike the Lenin monuments, have been neither dismantled nor vandalized. Instead, the de-Sovietization and adaptation of Soviet war monuments has often been achieved by adding a sculpture of the Virgin Mary mourning the fallen.7 Meanwhile, the problem of integrating the activities of the nationalist underground (UPA) into the new, Ukrainian version of the war was solved by emphasizing UPA’s resistance to the Germans and the supposed democratic evolution of the nationalist movement after 1943, on the one hand, and by ignoring the UPA’s anti-Polish actions in Volhynia and participation in the Nazi policies of the annihilation of Jews, on the other.8 At the same time, all attempts at official rehabilitation of UPA and recognition of the participants of the nationalist underground as war veterans ended in failure, and this topic has now become one of the most intractable problems of post-Soviet Ukrainian memory politics.9 While some historians have argued for the importance of open recognition of the “dark sides” of UPA history while preserving its anti-Soviet and anti-German operations as a “symbol of Ukrainian patriotism,” 10 Ukrainian public debate has been dominated by attempts to absolve the nationalist underground of any serious responsibility for its deeds and to minimize its anti-Polish and anti-Jewish violence.11

Ukraine: A “Nationalizing State”?

In the early period of independence, the most consistent implementation of the new national narrative took place on the pages of school history textbooks. The key components of this narrative were a teleological approach to the nation-state as the highest aim and culmination of the historical process in Ukraine; a victimhood complex, whereby Ukrainians were portrayed as the autochthonal peaceful population, constantly forced to beat off the attacks of outside enemies; the description of Ukrainians as an internally monolithic group with developed democratic traditions; and essentialization of the current political and ethnical boundaries of Ukraine, with an emphasis on the putative community of destiny and expectations on the part of all the regions of Ukraine.12 Yet these textbooks existed in a pluralist space. In this space, the main alternatives to the national model combined elements of Soviet mythology, populism, and nostalgia, all
characteristics of what John-Paul Himka calls "post-Soviet" identity.\textsuperscript{13} Clearly, we should not overestimate how conscious the resistance to the official line was, nor, for that matter, how consciously nationalizing state policies were. As Volodymyr Kulyk has noted, "even the typology based on a combination of language and ethnicity, which divides society into Ukrainophones Ukrainians, Russophone Ukrainians and (Rusophone) Russians, seriously distorts the complicated structure of people's identities, much more opposed to any nationalism."\textsuperscript{14} The key to understanding the state politics of memory in this period, bearing in mind the complex sociocultural situation described by Kulyk, lies in acknowledging its profoundly contingent and multivectoral nature. The evolution of state memory politics arose out of the need to improvise a strategy that would steer a course between the priorities of bolstering the legitimacy of Ukraine and its post-Soviet elites, on the one hand, and avoiding provoking conflict, on the other, whether domestically, in the form of ethnic, linguistic, and/or religious conflict, or internationally, with Ukraine's neighbors, especially Russia. Where the resistance was strongest (the most telling example being the highly divisive church politics of the post-independence period, characterized by antagonistic struggles between the Russian Orthodox, Ukrainian Orthodox, and Greek Catholic churches) the state in effect took a back seat, and the sphere of chaotic pluralism was allowed to widen unchecked. At the same time, society's interest in history and its "blank spots" gradually receded and lost its oppositionist tone as the post-Soviet period proceeded.

The election of Leonid Kuchma as president in 1994 led to widespread expectations among the nationalist intelligentsia that a new raft of policies aimed at reconnecting Ukraine to Russia would follow. Kuchma had, after all, promised to strengthen relations with Russia and to give the Russian language official status. In the event, however, the newly elected president opted rather for an inconsistent and cautious policy of centrismos, governed perhaps above all else by Kuchma's intuitive sense of the potential of history to generate conflict. Kuchma had no desire to arouse such conflicts. His centrismos consisted of laying claim to the moderate middle ground while depicting his opponents—both "nationalist" and "communist"—as dangerous extremists. His positive program entailed a declared allegiance to the "universal" values of stability and prosperity, mixed with contingent and decorative ideological clichés.\textsuperscript{15} Ambivalence was the defining feature of the majority of Kuchma's decisions when it came to symbolic politics. The national currency, which he introduced in 1996, was given the Ukrainian name hryvnia, which dated to the times of old Rus', yet the smaller unit received the Russian-derived name kopitsa, a word that is not part of Ukrainian tradition. In 1998, he introduced the "Hero of Ukraine" medal, rendered in the classic Soviet form of a five-pointed star, but now on a Ukrainian blue-and-yellow ribbon. Kuchma's masterstroke was the regionalization of symbolic historical celebrations. For example, while the eighty-fifth birthday of the last leader of Soviet Ukraine Volodymyr Shcherbyts'kyi (who had presided over repressions against dissidents and the Chornobyl disaster) was being celebrated in Dnipropetrovsk, L'viv celebrated the birthday of Viacheslav Chornovil, a dissident who had spent time in prison camps under Shcherbyts'kyi, and which was also marked by Kuchma in a presidential decree.\textsuperscript{16} Cynicism and pluralism were employed in order to deprive history of its mobilizing force.

The rehabilitation of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army

Kuchma's administration had to address several very serious challenges when it came to historical politics. The first such challenge, which had not been resolved in the first three years of independence, was the question of the rehabilitation of the fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In all his speeches for the May 9 celebrations, Kuchma tried to avoid the topic of the UPA, and thus the far wider topic of intra-Ukrainian conflict. At the same time, however, the authorities tried to use the topic of rehabilitation of the UPA in everyday political battles. On May 28, 1997, a government commission for the study of the history of the OUN and UPA was established. The initial conclusions of the working group were published in 2000, and their final conclusions in 2005, when Kuchma was no longer in office. The conclusions contain a series of "innovative and self-critical interpretations" (foremost among them, the admission of the radical nationalist nature of the ideology of the OUN), but support the idea of the "establishment of historical justice" and official recognition of the fighters of the UPA as veterans of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{17}

In July 2004, the government proposed that the Ukrainian parliament give former UPA fighters veteran status, but the proposition was rejected. Thus, the concessions and social guarantees available
to former UPA fighters depend on the individual positions of the local authorities in the various regions of Ukraine. For example, in L'viv, UPA veterans (and there are around 590 of them to be reckoned in the city) receive a monthly addition to their pension from the municipal budget. In August 2005, the regional council of the Volhynia region recognized the UPA as one of the participating sides in the Second World War, and its veterans as “fighters for the freedom and independence of Ukraine on the territory of Volhynia.” Consequently, they were afforded concessions analogous to those of veterans of the Great Patriotic War, only, again, drawn from the municipal budget.\textsuperscript{18}

The second and no less complex challenge for the Ukrainian authorities was also connected to the war and the actions of the UPA. The year 2003 saw the sixtieth anniversary of the 1943 events in Volhynia, when hundreds of thousands of Polish civilians were killed or driven out of the region by UPA forces.\textsuperscript{19} In Poland, the anniversary of the massacres was marked by a series of events at state and civil society level. A prominent feature of these commemorations was accusations that the UPA had perpetrated ethnic cleansing and even genocide of Poles. A genuine discussion subsequently arose in the Ukrainian press around the question of Volhynia. Along with historians, journalists, and members of parliament, the head of the Presidential Administration Viktor Medvedchuk and the head of the Supreme Council Volodymyr Lytvyn took part in the debate.\textsuperscript{20} Their statements reflected Kuchma’s orientation toward a politically correct solution to the question. A joint appeal on the issue by the parliaments of Ukraine and Poland was passed by the Ukrainian Supreme Council by just one vote. In facilitating the passing of the appeal, and encouraging “correct” publications that could be presented to the Polish side as moves toward dialogue and compromise, Kuchma nevertheless did not take any measures that would give the problem a wider public forum in Ukraine. The result of this imitation of Vergangenheitsbewältigung is that today even many professional historians in Ukraine still know nothing about the events in Volhynia. According to sociological surveys, in 2003, 48.9 percent of Ukrainians knew nothing whatsoever about the Volhynia massacres of 1943,\textsuperscript{21} and there was almost no information about them in school textbooks. The ease with which the authorities spoke about “forgiveness” was accompanied by a lack of even minimal engagement with history, yet nevertheless displayed a readiness to use that history for political expediency.

The Shoah in the Ukrainian narrative of war

President Kuchma avoided the subject of the Holocaust in his official statements, even in his speech on the sixtieth anniversary of the mass shootings at Babyn Yar in Kyiv. The reluctance to raise this topic reflected the absence of an established language for describing the Shoah in the Ukrainian public space, as well as a general lack of experience in speaking about the topic among political elites. In the Soviet image of the war, the fact of the annihilation of the Jews by the Nazis was not denied, but Jews were not separated into a special category among the general mass of victims of Nazism.\textsuperscript{22} Thus, memorial plaques placed at the sites of the mass murder of Jews defined the victims as “Soviet citizens,” “citizens,” or “peaceful residents.” From the beginning of the 1990s, it became possible to name their ethnicity. The state did not obstruct the rebirth of memory of the genocide of Jews, but did not itself take part in the process. For this reason, regional disproportions immediately became evident: in Galicia, where there are almost no Jewish communities today, old synagogues are in an acutely dilapidated state;\textsuperscript{23} while in Dnipropetrovsk—a city with a strong Jewish community—not only was the synagogue beautifully restored, but one of the biggest Jewish community centers in Europe, with a museum of Ukrainian Jews, has been built.\textsuperscript{24}

New memorials to the victims of the Holocaust sometimes appeared in close proximity to Soviet-era memorials. In Dnipropetrovsk, for example, on April 14, 2001, a few hundred meters from a Soviet monument to “peaceful citizens—victims of fascism,” a new memorial appeared that bore the Hebrew and Yiddish inscription: “In this earth lie the remains of 10,000 peaceful Jews from Dnipropetrovsk who were brutally murdered on 13–14 October 1941, and also of many other of our sacred brothers and sisters, tortured and shot by the fascists (1941–1943).” Hundreds of memorial plaques to the victims of the Holocaust have appeared all over Ukraine. As a rule, they have been placed at the sites of mass shootings, and are thus often hidden away on the edges of cities or villages, in forests or by the side of roads. The erection of monuments, as well as the appearance of special publications and the establishment of summer schools and seminars about the Holocaust for students and teachers, has been the result not of government policy but of social initiatives, often supported by Western funds and embassies. The lack of any active state politics in commemorating the Holocaust distinguishes Ukraine from other East European countries, notably those newer members of the European Union.\textsuperscript{25}
The failure of the political nation?

The boldest, and thus most controversial, ideological step taken by Kuchma was the acknowledgment of the failure of the project that could be provisionally called the “Ukrainianization of Ukraine.” Kuchma announced that “[t]he Ukrainian national idea hasn’t worked [ne spratsiuvala],” although he did not define exactly what he meant by “national idea.” Most observers saw in these words another swing in the pendulum of Kuchma’s politics toward Russia, and a lack of desire to foster the development of Ukrainian culture. The idea implicit in Kuchma’s statement, that use of the Russian language and even allegiance to many elements of Soviet identity do not prevent one from being a political Ukrainian, was not elaborated. Paraphrasing Massimo d’Azeglio’s famous statement about Italy, “Ukraine has been created, now we have to create Ukrainians,” Kuchma tried to put forward the idea of the political nation. With the approach of the presidential elections in 2004, the president’s politics took on increasingly authoritarian tendencies. On the eve of the elections a sharp turn toward Russia occurred in Kuchma’s symbolic politics, evidence of which was the parade to celebrate 60 years since the liberation of Ukraine, on October 28, 2004, which was celebrated in Brezhnev style, and with Russian president Vladimir Putin in attendance. The events of the Orange Revolution of 2004, only a few weeks after Kuchma’s liberation parade, were completely unexpected by politicians and intellectuals in Ukraine, and had complex ramifications for Ukrainian society. One of the revolution’s results was the emergence of the image of a deep regional split, which became accepted both in Ukraine and internationally, and was famously expressed in the formula “two Ukraines”: a nationally conscious (western) Ukraine and a “creole” (eastern) Ukraine, with the former representing the desired ideal. This binary formula served as a universal explicatory mechanism that appropriated for itself almost absolute discursive authority. The politically grounded thesis of the “two Ukraines” reduced the repertoire of political choices and identifications to a simplified schema that produced an exclusive idea of norm and exception. At the same time, this idea implied a discriminatory attitude toward the Russophone part of the population, something that had its roots in intellectual publications of the mid-1990s. A response to the failure of the “Ukrainianization” project and an expression of the desire to place the entire responsibility for this failure on the authorities or on the strength of the Russian-Soviet tradition, the image of the “deeply split country” rests on the idea of a political confrontation, even a “geopolitical war,” between “pro-European” western Ukraine and the “zombified” and thus “pro-Russian, anti-market” eastern Ukraine.

The image of the split country was the main challenge to the symbolic politics of President Yushchenko (2005–10) and was actively exploited by his political opponents. Taking this situation into account, Yushchenko oriented his rhetorical strategy toward reconciliation and national unity, particularly with regard to the memory of the Second World War. The unity of the nation in the context of the war was posited by the president not in terms of realities, but in terms of aims and aspirations: even though millions of Ukrainians fought on different sides of the front, they all “loved their state, their Ukraine […]. The entire Ukrainian nation in one single push fought for its state.” This practice of integrating seemingly antagonistic symbols was typical of Yushchenko’s rhetoric. Thus, addressing UPA veterans, Yushchenko used the Soviet ideological construct of the Great Patriotic War, yet when addressing Soviet veterans on May 9, 2005, he included Ivan Mazepa—the archetypical antihero of imperial and Soviet versions of the Ukrainian past—in a list of figures who had dreamed of Ukrainian statehood. The height of this integrative policy was Yushchenko’s grouping together of General Vatutyn, killed by UPA partisans, and UPA commander Roman Shukhevych, as two heroes of the struggle for Ukrainian unity. An innovation in Yushchenko’s statements, in comparison to Kuchma’s speeches, was his attention to the Holocaust (though he ignored the question of Ukrainian coparticipation) and the Soviet deportation of the Crimean Tatars. This rhetoric of reconciliation and the raising of the Holocaust, however, achieved minimal public resonance.

The Holodomor of 1932–33 as genocide against Ukrainians

In the 2000s, an issue of prime symbolic importance was the quest for official international recognition of the Holodomor, the man-made famine of 1932–33, as a result of which millions of peasants died, as “genocide of the Ukrainian people.” The famine was recognized as genocide by the parliaments of more than ten European countries. The Ukrainian parliament voted for this recognition only after the parliaments in Estonia, Canada, Argentina, Hungary, Italy, and
Lithuania. The Supreme Council recognized the Holodomor as "genocide of the Ukrainian people" on November 28, 2006. However, MPs amended the text of the presidential resolution from the formulation "genocide of the Ukrainian nation" (natsiia) to "genocide of the Ukrainian people" (naro), with the view that the first definition was ethnic and the second political.

In 2008, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Holodomor was the main event in Yushchenko's symbolic political calendar. The occasion was marked by the opening of memorials in Kyiv and near Kharkiv, a series of exhibitions of archival documents organized by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the publication of regional "Books of Memory" containing lists of the victims and lectures in most schools on the topic of the Holodomor. That year, for the first time since 2005, no celebrations were held to mark the anniversary of the Orange Revolution in connection with the official Day of Memory (the fourth Saturday of November). The phrase "Holodomor-genocide" became commonplace in the public speeches of officials.

Observers noted that the active political use of the topic of the mass famine of 1932–33 was a way of symbolically delimiting the Soviet past, and a project aimed at "rebirth" of the memory of a tragedy that had taken place precisely in the south and east of Ukraine. Yushchenko's interest in the Holodomor was, on the one hand, a political calculation aimed at reaching out to all of Ukraine, including those regions where he enjoyed less support, but on the other hand, it also reflected his deep personal connection to the topic. The president even appeared in a documentary film about the famine, The Living (Zhyvi), by Serhiy Bukovsky, where he described the dying out of his native village in the Suny region. It was this deeply personal, not purely instrumental treatment of history that distinguished Yushchenko from other Ukrainian presidents.

War of monuments

In 2006, Ukraine became engulfed in a war of monuments. The warring parties comprised the two main political forces in the country: the "orange" supporters of the president and his opponents from the "blue-and-white" Party of Regions and its ally, the "red" Communist Party. The former camp supported historical initiatives that were associated with the national movement, whose figures had often been erased from the Soviet version of history; the latter supported symbols associated with the Soviet and Russian Imperial pasts. The opposing symbolic initiatives were monologic and completely deaf to the position of the other side. When Yushchenko called for a "reconciliation of veterans," the Communist Party of Ukraine decided to react in monumental form. On September 14, 2007, on the central square in Symferopol', the communists (with the support of the Crimean authorities) unveiled a monument to "the Soviet victims of fascist collaborators," the OUN/UPA. A memorial to Soviet victims of the UPA appeared in Luhans'k in May 2010. It is telling that in both cases the authors of the monuments were interested only in the "Soviet" victims of the national underground, and not at all in Jews or Poles.

For their part, local city councils of Symferopol', Odesa, Sevastopol', and Luhans'k decided to erect or "restore" monuments to Russian empress Catherine II as their founder. President Yushchenko tried to intervene, but the local authorities paid no attention to his appeals. Many commentators saw the references to local memory in this episode as a cover for political motives. At the same time, references to the Austrian imperial heritage in western Ukraine have not provoked such a reaction. For example, on October 4, 2008 the chairman of the Supreme Council of Ukraine Arsenii Yatseniuk laid the foundation stone for a future moment to Emperor Franz Joseph in the center of his native Chernivtsi. The monument was completed in 2009. The main difference between the memories of the Habsburg and Romanov Empires lies in the fact that calling on the Habsburg heritage is seen as "safe" for contemporary Ukrainian identity, as it represents a past that is unambiguously past; the Russian Empire, on the other hand, is construed as closely linked to a present political project, and references to its heritage in local memory are interpreted as a real threat to the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian identity.

Mazepa, Petliura, and Bandera as "Reincarnations" of Ukrainian patriotism (or separatism)

Today, certain Ukrainian historical figures are accepted calmly and unanimously across the whole of Ukraine. These happen to be the ones who were sanctioned by the Soviet canon. Monuments to Taras Shevchenko, Lesia Ukrainka, or Ivan Franko, all integral to the Soviet vision of Ukrainian history and culture, provoke objections neither in...
A particularly negative emotional response accompanies three names, three symbols of Ukrainian separatism, nationalism and the national movement, who were outside of the Soviet canon. The first figure is Hetman Mazepa, who switched from the Russians to the Swedes in 1708 in the Great Northern War, thus ending up on the losing side, and died in exile soon after. The second is Otaman Symon Petliura, one of the leaders of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917-21, who was killed in 1926 by a Soviet agent in Paris. The third is the leader of the radical wing of the OUN Stepan Bandera, who was killed in 1959 in Munich by a KGB agent. These three figures function as though they were reincarnations of one another, and each of them has been used as a negative metonym for the Ukrainian movement. In the perception of the public, they have turned into symbols rather than real historical figures, and they all received special attention in President Yushchenko’s memory politics.

One of the priorities of this politics was the reconceptualization of the image of Ivan Mazepa (though the portrait of Mazepa had already appeared on the ten hryvnia note under Kuchma). In December 2006, Ukraine turned down the offer from President Putin of a “joint celebration of the 300th anniversary of the battle of Poltava”—the battle in which Mazepa switched sides, thus gaining the reputation of a “traitor” in the Russian historical tradition. On October 9, 2007, President Yushchenko issued an order on “the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the events connected to the military and political actions of Hetman of Ukraine Ivan Mazepa and the signing of the Ukrainian-Swedish Union.” The proposed definition of the meaning of these events did not mention the Battle of Poltava. One of the key elements of the celebrations was the restoration of Baturyn, Mazepa’s residence, which had been burned down by Peter the Great’s forces in 1708. It is worth noting that the first commemorative plaques at Baturyn were installed as early as 1991, and two years later a state historical-cultural site called “The Hetman’s Capital” was created; in 2001 Baturyn was included in the List of Historical Settlements of Ukraine. However, before Yushchenko’s election as president, the restoration work had proceeded slowly and was not a state priority.

In the mid-2000s, plans were laid for the erection of a monument to Symon Petliura in his native Poltava. However, in July 2007 the Court of Arbitration of the Poltava region ruled that the Poltava regional state administration had acted illegally in installing a memorial plaque to Symon Petliura on the site of the future monument. On September 19, 2007, the same court forced the regional administration to remove the plaque from its location. In this situation the president was powerless before the decision of the local authorities, and the monument to Petliura was never built.

The most resonant of this trio of nationalist figures was Stepan Bandera, the leader of the radical wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and a political terrorist in interwar Poland, who spent almost all of the Second World War in a special barrack of the German concentration camp at Sachsenhausen. Bandera became a negative byword in Soviet discourse for Ukrainian nationalists, called banderovtsy (Banderites) or bandery (Banderas). The regional canonization of Bandera, as mentioned above, had been in full swing under both Kravchuk and Kuchma. Yushchenko was the first president to risk raising that canonization to a national level. He did this, however, at the very end of his presidency, after the first round of presidential elections in 2010, in which he polled only 5.45 percent of the vote. Yushchenko’s decision to award Bandera the title of “Hero of Ukraine” represented a serious blow to the president’s reputation, most of all in Poland. Soon after the election of Viktor Yanukovych, the decision to award the title was reversed by a Donetsk court on the formal grounds that Bandera had never been a citizen of Ukraine. Yet the court did not use any arguments related to the antidemocratic nature of the OUN’s ideology to support its decision, and neither did it mention the anti-Polish or anti-Jewish actions of the UPA.

The traps of salutary pluralism

In post-Soviet Ukraine, in 20 years of independence, no single, united national historical narrative has been formed. This absence leads to attempts, especially on a state level, to combine the uncombinable, such as, for example, presenting the history of the Soviet and the nationalist underground in the context of the “unity of the people in wartime.” Various images of the past coexist, compete, and interact in this picture. At the same time, the key positions retain within themselves a slightly modified Soviet schema and nationalist narrative (the latter in many ways, but not exclusively, based on the historical memory of Ukrainians from East Galicia). The situational—and in many ways liberating—pluralism of memory that has formed in the country functions not so much as a space
of dialogue, but rather as a collision of different, closed, and quite aggressive narratives that exist because they cannot destroy their competitors. Each of the narratives, nationalist and Soviet alike, avoids questions of responsibility: for pogroms, repressions, or punitive operations. The responsibility for all horrors and crimes is passed on to external forces: the Kremlin, the NKVD, the Polish underground, the Nazis. What’s more, both of the two main images of the past insist that they are bypassed by the state, deprived of care and support, while the opposite side receives too much attention from the authorities; of course, depending on the given political situation, there may be some truth to these claims, but they nevertheless tend to persist regardless of the disposition of the government.

Historical narratives are used by politicians in Ukraine as instruments of division, rather than consensus. In a situation where the socioeconomic programs of the main political forces are practically identical, easily recognizable, and always controversial, historical (and also linguistic) themes play the role of ideal markers of political difference. For this reason, the problems of monuments or the rights of veterans are activated year after year during preelection campaigns and then fade away after the campaigns finish. This situation seems to be eternal, since Kyiv has no other option than to allow the existence and development of constantly renewed and reinforced local images of the past.

The conscious line of the authorities to, in various ways, maintain ambiguity as a way of avoiding social conflict has predetermined the inconsistency and cautious nature of state politics of memory. The events of the Orange Revolution showed the mobilizing potential of a combination of nationalism and democratic slogans, and heightened awareness of the acute variation among the regions, which could be reduced neither to absolute formulas of national “unity” (“sobornist”) nor to the simple, antagonistic image of “two Ukraines.” The lack of social consensus in almost all questions of historical politics prevents the development of an all-Ukrainian image of the past, yet it also serves as an obstacle to the explicit, monopolistic instrumentalization of the past in the service of one political force or another. The question of whether it is worth striving to achieve a single national narrative or whether it is more productive to maintain the space of pluralism remains a rhetorical one in Ukraine, given the weakness of the state, the lack of strategic thinking among its elites, and the strength of the various local traditions.

Notes


6. It should be noted that the “de-Russification” of Ukraine was never openly formulated or adopted as a national policy. However, as a method of rationalizing the behavior of a significant segment of the country’s population, it did gain remarkable popularity, especially in western Ukraine. The most important component of “de-Russification” (again, never consistently followed at state level) was the widening of the spheres of use of the Ukrainian language and, simultaneously, the cleansing of the language with a view to reversing the Soviet standardization carried out in the 1930s and later. All post-Soviet attempts at language reform in Ukraine that aimed to “overcome Russification” ended in failure, with the possible exception of the official reversion in 1990 to the use of the Ukrainian letter “r,” which had been banned in 1933.

7. On the “domestication” of the Soviet monument in Carpathian Slavs'ke, see Andriy Portnov, “Pluralität der Erinnerung Denkmäler und Geschichtspolitik in der Ukraine,” Osteuropa, 6 (2008), 197–210. The same tactics in post-Soviet Moldova are described in Ludmila Cojocari, “Political


10. A telling example of such logic can be found in Yaroslav Hrytsak, "Tezy do dyskusji pro UPA," in Yaroslav Hrytsak, Strasti za nationalizm (Kyiv: Krytyka, 2004), pp. 90–113 (p. 111).


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Renaissance to Modern Times, ed. by Judit Targarona Borras and Angel Sáenz-Badillos, pp. 274-82 (p. 280).
29. Most notable among them being Mykola Rjabtschuk [Mykola Riabchuk], Die reale und die imaginerte Ukraine, trans. by Ju Durkot (Frankfurt/Main: Sulkramp, 2005).
34. By the end of Yushchenko's presidency there were no less than 400 memorial signs to the victims of the Holodomor across Ukraine. The majority of them are modest crosses in cemeteries or small monuments, and some of these erected before Yushchenko came to power. For an attempt to catalogue these monuments see Erinnerungsorte an den Holodomor 1932/33 in der Ukraine, ed. by Anna Kaminsky (Leipzig: Leipzig University Verlag, 2008).
38. Anthropological research does not always confirm such claims. For instance, Tanya Richardson shows that for many Odessans the "restoration" of Catherine II monument had no pro-imperial connotations and could be combined with loyalty toward Ukrainian statehood; see Tanya Richardson, Kaleidoscopic Odessa: History and Place in Contemporary Ukraine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2008).
40. On the formation of the Soviet canon of Ukrainian culture and the participation of local elites in this process, see Serhiy Yekelchyk, Stalin's Empire of Memory: Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imaginization (Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 2004).
43. In Soviet as well as Western popular perception, Petliura was widely seen as responsible for the pogroms of Jews during the Civil War (1917–21) in Ukraine. His murderer explained his motive to kill Petliura as revenge for the pogroms, and was subsequently released by the French court that had put him on trial. A nuanced analysis of Ukrainian-Jewish relations in the 1920s and Petliura's role in them can be found in Henry Abramson, A Prayer for the Government: Ukrainians and Jews in Revolutionary Times, 1917–1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).


46. A similar “multihistoricism” characteristic of post-Soviet Russian memory has been described by Alexander Etkind in his “Vremia sravnivat’ kamni,” Ab Imperio, 2 (2004), 33–76.